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Abstract. State estimation is vital for the stability of control systems
particularly the power system which heavily relies on measurement de-
vices installed throughout the wide area network. Recently, the problems
of bad data injection and topology error have been thoroughly analysed,
with numerous newly proposed mitigation and protection schemes.
In this paper we consider hierarchical state estimators (HSE) relying on
the common WLS formulation and study the propagation of faults in
both intermediate and top-level state estimates as a result of re-ordering
attack on a single area in the bottom level. Though at present time, our
grids are equipped with modern defence but re-ordering attacks are still
possible in the presence of such protections via ISO/IEC 62351 controls.
We concentrate on how an inexpensive swapping attack in one area of the
lower level influence the accuracy of other areas in the same level/upper
levels and force the system towards undesirable state. We use the IEEE
test cases for validation and illustration of results.
Keywords: Power system, smart grid, hierarchical state estimation,
re-ordering attack
1 Introduction
Efficient and reliable Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems along with Energy Management Systems (EMS) contribute
to efficient and safe operation of the power grid. The SCADA system
gathers measurement data from remote substations into a control
centre. EMS process all the collected data at the control centre by an
on-line application called state estimation. State estimation allows
the operator to get an accurate estimate of the state despite noisy or
faulty measurement data by using a steady state flow model in the
physical system [1],[2]. Numerous EMS applications e.g, contingency
analysis use the estimated state and therefore the state estimation
is crucial both for the efficiency and the safety of the power grid’s
operation.
Modern power systems are becoming more inter-connected and less
likely to be dependant on a single control centre for operations. This
way, operational efficiency can be improved by having multiple oper-
ators throughout the system e.g., in hierarchical or distributed struc-
ture. Each operator has its own control center and SCADA/EMS
system to manage a certain region of the system. Examples of such
inter-connected systems include ENTSO-E in Europe and Western
Interconnect (WECC) in the U.S. among others. In the future, power
systems are expected to be more inter-connected than before and
thus, systems with no central co-ordinators should be anticipated.
For the safety of the large inter-connected power network, timely
exchange of accurate information between the regional operators is
quite important. Practically, the data exchange is limited due to
sensitivity related issues. Regardless of this, all the exchanged infor-
mation is used by the respective regional operators for estimating
the local state and that way contribute to the state of the whole
system.
HSE requires that control centres on each level exchange data regu-
larly. Standard Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol (ICCP)
is a widely used protocol to transmit information from one level to
another in HSE. Access control is possible using this protocol but it
does not provide key-based authentication for the exchanged data.
Therefore standard layer protocols such as TLS as mandated by IEC
62351 are used to provide authentication for ICCP associations [3].
As a result, ICCP messages might be passed in clear text to the
protocol stalk providing authentication. An adversary can compro-
mise all incoming and outgoing messages from ICCP by installing a
Trojan [4]. The vulnerability of control systems to such attacks can
be seen by the fact that ICCP relations are often formed between
hosts in civil areas.
The main objective of the present paper is to determine certain
conditions under which one compromised region at lower level can
have a desired impact on other regions in same level of hierarchy by
propagation of faults upto the top level and then way back to each
level. An attacker can force its desired impact on other region(s) by
manipulating a single region realistically, an attacker is limited in
the magnitude of change that can be induced this way. We aim to
determine a necessary condition on which a minimum cost attack
can be formulated to give maximum impact.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Background
and related work are briefly described in section 2 and a description
of the system models used in state estimation, bad-data detection
and identification is presented in the section 3. Hierarchical state
estimation is outlined in section 4 and the novel measurement re-
ordering attack model is presented in section 5 along with the neces-
sary conditions to make the attack feasible. In section 6, simulation
results are shown for the introduced attack on IEEE bus systems.
We offer concluding remarks and suggest future work directions in
section 7.
2 Related Work
The effect of bad data on state estimation in power systems has
long been studied including in the influential work by Schweppe and
Wildes [5], with a bad data detection algorithm inside state estima-
tion typically depending on simple statistical threshold to remove
outliers.
When the measurement data collected by SCADA system is com-
promised, a straightforward outcome can be an undesirable state by
forcing the state estimator without further constraints on data and
correlation among them especially the case examined by Liu et al.
[6] relying on DC power flows and a number of consequent studies
on how to find the minimal undetectable attacks require the least
manipulation of data [7], [8].
One of the earliest works on hierarchical state estimation (HSE)
is by Van Cutsem in his survey in which he over-viewed the ad-
vancements in HSE that helps in building present models. Lakshmin
proposed a two-level HSE algorithm for wide area power systems as-
suming a highly reliable PMU at every boundary bus. Several types
of data attacks on decentralised state estimation are explained while
no argument about computational complexity is made [4]. More-
over, the offered mitigation scheme involving outlier approach that
can detect the errors after hundreds of iterations and even then the
identification of attack can not be made possible.
False data injection (FDI) attacks that were initially formulated
on conventional state estimation, were proved to be possible in hi-
erarchical topology as well [9]. Further, Baiocco et al. present au-
tomated (graph) partitioning of robust HSE as a result of some
unexpected failure of single/multiple lines or due to some attack
[10]. Motivated by PMU’s spoofing attack in [11], ill-conditionality
of Jacobian can be achieved that leads to divergence by including
jitter in communication channels of HSE [12]. A number of state
estimators have been proposed, but studies of robustness against at-
tacks has concentrated solely on the centralised case hence Baiocco
et al. discuss the hierarchical case particularly relevant for smart and
micro-grid environments [15].
In [13], we highlighted the vulnerabilities in the existing com-
munication infrastructure by introducing an attack relying solely on
re-ordering of the measurement vector which result in undesirable es-
timates by formulating targeted re-ordering attack. It is worth noting
that we assumed that the preceding and present measurement vec-
tors are known to the attacker. Specifically, considering two distinct
scenarios, the system diverged as a result of ill-conditioned Jacobian.
3 Power System State Estimation
As usual, we denote the power system by a graph G with a set of V
buses and E transmission lines. We consider AC power flow model
for the network. It is given by
z = h(x) + e (1)
where z ∈ Rm is measurement vector, x ∈ Rn is the state vector
(m > n), h is the measurement function relating z to x and e is the
noise vector having zero mean and known co-variance R. The errors
are assumed to be independent, therefore, R = diag{σ21, σ22, · · · , σ2m}
is a diagonal matrix.
Once the states (let us call them xˆ) are estimated by solving
Normal Equations,
[F TR−1F ]∆xˆ = F TR−1[x− f(x)] (2)
bad data analysis is done by a statistical threshold τ
r = z− h(xˆ) (3)
Residual values larger than τ are detected and corresponding
measurements are flagged as bad and after their removal, state es-
timation can be re-run until the system converges. But bad data
detection is not easy if there is more than one bad measurement. In
practice a bad data goes undetected due to the presence of other bad
data or good measurements are flagged as bad due to other reasons
such as topology change (for more details of state estimation, please
visit [1]).
4 Hierarchical State Estimation
The conventional or centralized state estimation which is currently in
use worldwide can be followed by a multi-area hierarchical procedure
in which local state estimators processes all the raw measurements
available locally, hence transferring only a manageable data set to its
immediate higher level. This process continues until the highest level
where the state for the whole system is evaluated and conveyed to the
lower levels for other crucial tasks for example bad data processing
[14]. The multi-area hierarchical structure is of two types, i.e., sym-
metric hierarchy and asymmetric hierarchy. Symmetric hierarchy is
the one with a balanced division of bus-bars/tie-lines in all regions
whereas, asymmetric hierarchy is the one with an unbalanced dis-
tribution of bus-bars/tie-lines among regions. While symmetric HSE
is trivial and easy to understand, asymmetric is more realistic and
general in power systems. For this reason, from now onwards, we
are considering only asymmetric hierarchical state estimation. It is
worth mentioning here that the following HSE formulation in this
section is taken from [12] and [15].
Baioccoo et al. introduced a tree structure to represent multi-
area hierarchical SE with the tree root (level k) denoting the highest
level state estimation [15]. At lower levels, each level can have child
nodes and those without child nodes are known as leaf nodes and
lie on the lowest level (level 1) of hierarchy. Each node performs its
own state estimation using the measurements available in terms of
estimated states from the lower nodes and for level 1, measurements
are obtained by computing power flows. We assume here that the
partitioning is already done and it is robust that ensures and there
is no overlapping between areas except the common tie-lines con-
necting the neighbouring areas.
When a node estimates its state vector, it must send this output
(including the Gain matrix) over to all the child or to the parent
node. This kind of multi-area HSE works on a two-way transmis-
sion of information i.e, from lower levels information flow towards
the higher ones until it reaches the root node and then re-send the
estimation towards leaf nodes such that the updated state spread on
all the tie-line branches.
A general k level multi-area state estimation can be expressed
as:
y0,j1 = f1,j1(y1,j1) + e1,j1 , j1 = 1, · · · , r1
y0,b1 = f1,b1(y1) + e1,b1
(4)
y1,j2 = f2,j2(y2,j2) + e2,j2 , j2 = 1, · · · , r2
y1,b2 = f2,b2(y2) + e2,b2
(5)
...
y0,b1 = f1,b1(y1) + e1,b1 (6)
where
y0,j1 local measurement vector in Sj1 at level 1;
y0,b1 border measurement vector at level 1;
y1,j2 local measurement vector in Sj2 at level 2;
y1,b2 border measurement vector at level 2;
yk state vector of over all system;
fl corresponding non-linear measurement functions for each
level l;
el corresponding Gaussian measurement noise vector.
Now, let us formulate each level
Level 1 multi-area state estimation: For level 1, each area Sj esti-
mates its own state y˜1j by solving the corresponding Normal Equa-
tions iteratively
[F T1,j1R
−1
1,j1
F1,j1 ]∆y˜1,j1 = F
T
1,j1
R−11,j1 [y0,j1 − f1,j1(y1,j1(k))]
[F T1,b1R
−1
1,b1
F1,b1 ]∆y˜1,j1 = F
T
1,b1
R−11,b1 [y0,b1 − f1,b1(y1,j1(k))]
(7)
where the inputs at this level include the measurement vectors y0,j1
and y0,b1 and the Jacobian matrices, F1,j1 and F1,b1 and the gain ma-
trices R1,j1 and R1,b1 . Note that the Jacobian matrices are updated
at every iteration.
Level i multi-area state estimation: The following two equations must
be solved for each intermediate level hierarchically from the lower
levels. Using the estimate y˜i−1,ji−1 from the level l − 1 as the mea-
surements in a distributed approach, y˜i,ji can be obtained from [9]
[F Ti,ji−1Gi−1,ji−1Fi,ji−1 ]∆y˜i−1,ji−1(k) = F
T
i,ji−1Gi−1,ji−1 [y˜i−1,ji−1 − fi,ji−1(yi(k))]
[F Ti,biGi−1,bi−1Fi,bi ]∆y˜i−1(k) = F
T
1,b1
Gi−1,bi−1 [y˜i−1 − fi(yi(k))]
(8)
Based on the estimates from level i and i+ 1, the Jacobian matrices
are revised.
Level l multi-area state estimation: Using the vector y˜l1 supplied by
the lower level l−1 as the measurement vector, the system state can
be estimated by iteratively solving the following equations
[F Tl,jl−1Gl−1,jl−1Fl,jl−1 ]∆y˜l−1,jl−1(k) = F
T
l,jl−1Gl−1,jl−1 [y˜l−1,jl−1 − fl,jl−1(yl(k))]
[F Tl,blGl−1,bl−1Fl,bl ]∆y˜l−1(k) = F
T
1,b1
Gl−1,bl−1 [y˜l−1 − fl(yl(k))]
(9)
The HSE outlined above requires two-way interchange of data be-
tween local state estimators at each layer of the hierarchy [12].
4.1 Simplification of a multi-level HSE to a 3-level HSE
Now, Let us simplify the multi-level approach to three level for better
understanding. Then the three-level model can be explained as
y0,j1 = f1,j1(y1,j1) + e1,j1 , j1 = 1, 2
y0,b = f1,b(y1,b) + e1,b
y1,j2 = f2,j2(y2,j2) + e2,j2 , j2 = 1, 2
y1,b = f2,b(y2,b) + e2,b
y2 = f3(x) + e3
(10)
where, the measurement vectors y0,j1 , y1,j1 and y0,b, y1,b, the state
vectors y1,j1 , y2,j2 and yb,j1 , yb,j2 and the non-linear measurement
functions f1,j1 , f2,j2 and f1,b, f2,b are as described earlier. For making
the process more simpler, lets assume that there are no border vari-
ables and the measurement functions are linear as well. Now, more
simplified version of three-level can be seen as
y0j = F1jy1j + e1j, j = 1, 2
y1j = F2jy2j + e2j, j = 1, 2
y2 = F3x+ e3
(11)
where F1j, F2j and F3 are the Jacobian matrices of the correspond-
ing measurement functions. For each area, the state estimator carries
out iterative solution algorithm and determines the local state vector
along with another iterative process among the two levels [9]
Level 1: The inputs at the first level are y1j for area j = 1, 2 (as-
suming two areas) and the weighting matrix R−11j . The output is the
local state vector yˆ1j for each area, Normal equations to be solved
by each area iteratively are
[F T1jR
−1
1j F
T
1j]yˆ1j = F
T
1jR
−1
1j y0j (12)
Level 2: The inputs at the second level are y1j for area j = 1, 2
(assuming two areas) and the weighting matrix R−11j . The output is
the local state vector yˆ1j for each area, Normal equations to be solved
by each area iteratively are
[F T2jR
−1
2j F
T
2j]yˆ2j = F
T
2jR
−1
2j y1j (13)
Level 3: The inputs of this level are state vectors of level-2 yˆ2 and the
gain matrices G2 = F
T
1jR
−1
2j F
T
2j as the weighting matrix. The output
xˆ is the state of the entire system when solving the following Normal
equations for the third level
[F T3 G
−1
2 F
T
3 ]xˆ = F
T
3 G
−1
2 yˆ2 (14)
where y2 and G2 can be found by juxtaposing the corresponding y2j
an G2j respectively.
5 Attack Model
The goal of our proposed attack is to create disruption in HSE.
To attain this goal, we consider that the attacker is capable of re-
ordering the measurement set y0 of only one partition S0 ∈ S in
the lower level l1 of hierarchy where S is the set of all partitions.
As a result, the untrue state variables are being transmitted to the
partitions at upper levels at the beginning of each iteration of HSE.
A structured re-ordering attack is considered while assuming the
internal knowledge of the partitions to launch the re-ordering attack
in a way that maximizes its effect. The knowledge required for the
success of the re-ordering attack includes some previous plausible
measurement set yold of the targeted partition. The main aim of the
attack is to have a desired/false local state estimate that propagate
to higher levels to produce certain estimate x.
The scheme we are following for the attack is a three level hierarchical
structure with the following constraints:
– Once the attack is launched on a single partition of level l1, the
data exchange between the upper two levels i.e, l2 and l3 would
still remain normal. That means there is no further attack on
upper levels.
– The network configuration, i.e, the sub area partitioning at level
l2 and l2 is not permitted to change over a course of full top-
down synchro-upgrade (This constraint is usually not required
by HSE[12].
After the attack, the flow equations of the first level would be like
[F T1jR
−1
1j F
T
1j]yˆ
∗
1j = F
T
1jR
−1
1j y
∗
0j (15)
where y∗0j is the swapped measurement vector of one of the sub-areas
at level one. The inputs at the second level y∗1j for area j = 1, 2 are
the false estimates from the first level and then
[F T2jR
−1
2j F
T
2j]yˆ
∗
2j = F
T
2jR
−1
2j y
∗
1j (16)
and finally, the output xˆ∗ is the state of the entire system when
solving the following Normal equations for the third level
[F T3 G
−1
2 F
T
3 ]xˆ
∗ = F T3 G
−1
2 yˆ
∗
2 (17)
where y∗2 and G2 are as defined earlier in section 4.1.
In case of False Data Injection (FDI), a generally denotes the
attack vector that shows the amount of change to the original mea-
surement vector [6].
a = Fc
where c is a vector denotes the magnitude of change and is bounded
by some stealthy condition. Jamming or delay attacks can be seen as
a sub-class of re-ordering as they resend the previous data with some
time interval. Also, attacks performed by replaying or blocking the
measurement vector can be considered a special case of re-ordering
with a time constraint on them. The common aspect among all of
the above is that there is no attack vector to be added, rather ad-
versary just drop/block or jitter the measurements irrespective of
whether they are secure/protected or not by hacking the communi-
cation infrastructure. Therefore, a general term, re-ordering of the
measurement vector is introduced where the adversary swap the true
measurement vector with the previously plausible (true) vector.
In this case, time horizon is critical for the attacker and it de-
termines the strength of the attack. Being realist, we assume that
the attacker has the measurement information from the present till
some particular limited point in time. Within these time instances,
the attacker can choose the measurement vector to be swapped the
present one while keeping itself hidden. By hidden, we mean an at-
tack that is successful in state forcing or non-convergence while be-
ing in-noticed by the model-based bad data detection. There may
be more sophisticated detection criteria, of course, but these apply
mostly to determining whether measurement devices (vector entries)
are compromised, and that doesn’t apply here. Other models rely on
redundancy among measurements to determine compromise, but for
a network-based attack this does not match very well.
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5.1 Re-ordering Attack Cost and Attack Impact
We quantify the minimum attack cost as the attacking cost where at-
tacker needs to put the least effort to get the maximum Mean Square
Error (MSE) and denote it by Γy. All the regions in the power grid
can be secured in one of the three ways, i.e. non tamper proof au-
thentication (Sntp ⊆ Sm), tamper-proof authentication (Stp ⊆ Sm)
or protected. Non-tamper proof authentication is of Bump-in-the-
Wire (BITW) type device authentication or a Remote Terminal Unit
(RTU) with a non tamper-proof authentication module. The regions
with this type of authentication are only susceptible to attacks by
some physical access to the region from where the data is origi-
nated. Tamper-proof authentication is not susceptible to attacks in
any case. Other cases of protection are also possible by guards or
video surveillance and generally this type is also not vulnerable to
attacks. But realistically, all regions of the power grid can not be
made protected by all means and there must be at least one region
that is vulnerable (Sm′). If the region where the measurement vector
to be attacked is located is protected and uses non tamper-proof au-
thentication or tamper-proof authentication then the measurement
is not vulnerable and we define Γy = ∞. Otherwise, for a measure-
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Fig. 2: Information flow in Hierarchical State Estimation
ment y, we define Γy as
Γy = min ‖a‖ s.t. a = Fc = yˆnew − yˆold and
a(y) 6= 0 =⇒ |S(m′)| 6= 0, s.t. S = S(m) ∪ S(m′)
(18)
where Sm denotes authenticated areas/regions and Sm′ denotes the
vulnerable areas s.t. S = S(m) ∪ S(m′).
In addition, we assume that the attacker is free to choose the set
from plausible measurements in a particular time frame to be used
for re-ordering attack. As a result of this freedom and the attack cost
(Γy) mentioned above, we quantify the maximum attack impact as
the attacker’s outcome and denote it by Iy
Iy = max I =
√∑
(y˜new − y˜old)2
s.t. tnew − told > 
(19)
where t denotes the time slot among the available time frames to
the attacker and  is the pre-defined threshold to limit the attacker’s
choice. Superscripts “old” and “new” denotes the measurement used
in the swapping and the measurement to be swapped respectively.
6 Numerical Results
Before going into the detail of simulation results, it should be recalled
that to perform re-ordering attacks, the attacker requires the topol-
ogy/subspace knowledge of the system and it is assumed that the
topology is not changing or it is static in the duration of the attack.
In this section, we discuss the performance of the above mentioned
model in constructing the re-ordering attacks on each region of a hi-
erarchical state estimation by simulations on IEEE 118-bus systems.
We divide the 118-bus system into 6 sub-areas/regions and addition-
ally there is an intermediate level between the top and bottom layers
(shown in Fig. 1). Since the presented hierarchical model is two-way
synchro-upgrade model i.e., at first, from lower level to the top-most
and then the way back to the bottom levels again, it is very inter-
esting to see the error propagation after the proposed attack. The
attacker is free to choose the particular data set from a certain time
frame i.e, attacker has a limited amount previous data knowledge.
The technique used to estimate the state is WLS and MATPOWER
is used for loading the data for AC model.
Mean square error (MSE) after performing least cost re-ordering
attacks of the type described in subsection 5.1, is illustrated in Fig.
3 for 118-bus system. Figure denotes the logarithm (base 10) of MSE
for one complete round of WLS state estimation i.e., from the lower
layer the the top (Fig. 3) and all the way down detailing how that
error propagates from the lower level to the top and back again. We
can clearly see that in the end of a complete round after re-ordering
attack, all areas are affected no matter what the intensity is and
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Fig. 3: Effect of re-ordering at lower level of HSE
which area is re-ordered individually. The important point to no-
tice is the epidemic property of the attack and it shows the error
propagation from one infected area at lower level to all the areas at
lower level. The plot illustrates how a single area from lower level
hierarchy influence all the areas at lower level such that the attacker
can choose for the cheapest and the most vulnerable area to perform
the attack. An obvious observation is that the error is maximum for
the areas from where the attack originates. In the given partitioning
of 118-bus system, area-5 seems to be the most vulnerable as the
system diverges when the input data is re-ordered. It is worth not-
ing here that the partitioning of 118-bus system for the re-ordering
attack is a particular one and other cases may exist.
The measurement re-ordering attack as described in section 5 is
made to work even if some parts of power system are integrity pro-
tected. Key observation is that currently in our power grid, all the
measurements are not authenticated time-stamped to detect such
re-ordering and such authentication for detection purposes is ade-
quately expensive to implement all over the grid atleast till near
future. This implies that as long as there are old components in our
power network, there can be a chance of such kind of attacks. But, in
ten years time, cryptographically time-stamped authentication can
be made possible over the entire network leaving the re-ordering at-
tack less effective.
7 Conclusion
We proposed an attack termed as “re-ordering attacks” on hierar-
chical state estimation that we introduced earlier in [13] where the
adversary uses swapping of data sets as a tool to swap the order of
data with some previous data set while not injecting or modifying
any data. The present paper relied on the fact that not all parts
of the grid can be made tamper/non-tamper proof authenticated
over night. Therefore, a targeted re-ordering attack on the most vul-
nerable region of the system is studied that can provide desirable
propagation of error all over the system and not just the attacked
area. Moreover, it can be clearly seen that such an attacker can force
the estimate of a authenticated region by launching an intelligent at-
tack in less protected region.
Our ongoing research includes determining the mitigation/protection
to the re-ordering on hierarchical or fully distributed state estima-
tion which is more realistic in the smart grid. Other possible future
research includes answering how much and which particular mea-
surements should be swapped for the optimal swapping attack.
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